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For Laplace, equal possibilities entail equal probabilities. However, 'equally possible' better not 
mean 'equally probable' since this renders the definition circular. Yet, there doesn't seem to be a 
plausible 'possibility-probability link'. The attempt to justify the principle of indifference by 
appealing to equipossibility risks either circularity or a lack of justification. Recently, Pettigrew 
(2016) has provided an argument for the principle of indifference by adapting Joyce's well-known 
arguments from accuracy (1998/2009). Here, I will argue that Pettigrew's argument implicitly 
relies on the notion of equipossibility: Just like Laplace, his argument is either circular or 
unjustified. However, I conclude on a positive note. Pettigrew’s argument can be seen as an 




The principle of indifference tells us that we should assign probability 1/n to each of n mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive events if we do not have further evidence in favor of any of the 
events. This principle, on the face of it, simply tells us not to treat the events differently if we do 
not have evidence telling us that they are different. As Norton (2008) notes, principles like the 
principle of indifference 
 
…are such innocuous principles of evidence as to be near platitudes. They both derive 
from the notion that beliefs must be grounded in reasons and, in the absence of 
distinguishing reasons, there should be no difference of belief. How could we ever doubt 
the notion that, if we have no grounds at all to pick between two outcomes, then we 
should hold the same belief for each?” (2008, 46) 
 
If the principle is accepted, then we have a clear way to set our priors at the beginning of inquiry 
and our epistemic pursuits: set it to the uniform distribution over all events. 
 
Agreed: the principle reeks of triviality. Yet, why should we think that ‘holding the same belief’ 
amounts to assigning the same degree of probability to each event? One way to cash this out 
arises in Laplace’s definition of probabilities: 
 
The theory of chance consists in reducing all the events of the same kind to a certain 
number of cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as we may be equally undecided about 
in regard to their existence, and in determining the number of cases favorable to the event 
whose probability is sought. The ratio of this number to that of all the cases possible 
is the measure of this probability, which is thus simply a fraction whose numerator is 
the number of favourable cases and whose denominator is the number of all the cases 




If we have six equally possible cases, then the probability of each of them occurring would simply 
be one out of six according to this definition – a straightforward application of the principle of 
indifference, which tells us that we should distribute probabilities equally across the number of 
cases if we have no further reason to distinguish between the cases other than that we are ‘equally 
undecided about’. Yet, the question again is this: what do we mean by ‘equally possible’ or 
‘equally undecided about in regard to their existence’ such that they dictate equal distributions 
of probabilities? It better not mean ‘equally probable’ since this renders the principle circular, but 
there doesn’t seem to be a good alternative that can provide a ‘possibility-probability link’, for, 
as Hájek (2012) notes, possibility does not come in degrees – things are either possible or not, 
so how do we compare ‘equality’ or ‘degrees’ of possibility? If we do not have an account, then 
this explanation of the principle of indifference is unjustified. In short, the attempt to justify the 
principle of indifference by appealing to ‘equally possible cases’ – the notion of ‘equipossibility’ 
– risks either circularity or a lack of justification. 
 
Recently, however, Pettigrew (2016) has provided an argument for why we ought to adopt the 
principle of indifference when setting our priors by adapting Joyce’s well-known argument from 
accuracy (1998/2009). This shall be our starting point. 
 
In this essay, I argue that Pettigrew’s argument risks the same problems that plagued Laplace 
because it relies on the notion of equipossibility: his argument is either circular or lacks 
justification. In II I rehearse the original Joycean argument for probabilism from accuracy, and 
in III I show how Pettigrew uses the argument from accuracy to the service of the principle of 
indifference. In IV I will show that this argument relies on an implicit assumption of 
equipossibility; this then leads the argument into the same problems of circularity or a lack of 
justification. However, in V I suggest that, despite its problems, Pettigrew’s account has 
significant merit, as it can be seen as providing an explication of Laplace’s original claim that 
equal possibilities demand equal probabilities, by augmenting the claim with arguments from 
accuracy. Concluding remarks ensue in VI. 
 
II. The Original Argument from Accuracy 
 
Joyce (1998/2009) argued that the Kolmogorov axioms of probability are mandated by 
rationality, because any credence distribution that does not adhere to the  axioms  of probability 
is always more inaccurate than some credence distribution that does adhere to the axioms of 
probability; non-probabilistic credence distributions are strictly dominated by some 
probabilistic credence distribution. Furthermore, there exists no non-probabilistic credence 
distribution such that this distribution is at least as good in accuracy as a probabilistic 
distribution in all worlds and better in accuracy than a probabilistic distribution in some world. 
This in turn suggests that we ought to adopt some probabilistic credence distribution instead 
of a non-probabilistic one if we think that being accurate – being as close to the truth as possible 
– is rationally required according to our norms of inquiry. 
 
To put things more rigorously, start by defining a measure of inaccuracy at a world Iw(c(p), o(p)) 
which takes as input a credence distribution c and the omniscient distribution o at world w, over 
the same set of propositions p. c is a possible distribution of probabilities over the set of 
propositions, and o tell us the actual truth-value of each proposition at that world (hence 
‘omniscient’). Intuitively, then, Iw(c, o) measures ‘how far from the truth’ a credence distribution 
is from the state of affairs – the actual truth-values of each proposition – at that world. 
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Minimizing Iw then has a natural interpretation of minimizing inaccuracy and thereby 
maximizing accuracy at that world. 
 
Discussions  of  such   inaccuracy   measures  often  center  on  the   squared   distance   measure, 
∑ [𝑐(𝑝) − 𝑜(𝑝)]2𝑝  which is also sometimes called the Brier score.
i Other scores exist, including 
the logarithmic measure which has some mathematical applications in recent  neuroscientific 
developments such as the Free Energy Principle. 
 
With such an accuracy measure in hand, Joyce then proves a theorem which forms the 
cornerstone of his argument. Define the set W of all possible worlds w, by considering all possible 
truth-assignments  to  the  set  of  all  propositions. Then,  given  a  non-probabilistic credence 
distribution cnoprob – one that violates Kolmogorov’s axioms in some way – there exists a 
probabilistic credence distribution cprob – one that does adhere to Kolmogorov’s axioms – which 
strictly dominates that non-probabilistic credence distribution in terms of accuracy: for all w, 
Iw(cprob, o) < Iw(cnoprob, o).  
 
Furthermore, given any probabilistic credence distribution, Joyce (channeled by Pettigrew 
(2016, 37–38)) also shows that it is not weakly dominated by any other non-probabilistic 
credence distribution: for all probabilistic credence distributions cprob, there does not exist any non-
probabilistic credence distribution cnoprob such that Iw(cnoprob, o) ≤ Iw(cprob, o) and for at least one 
world w Iw(cnoprob, o) < Iw(cprob, o) . 
 
In words: given any non-probabilistic credence distribution, there exists some probabilistic one 
that is strictly more accurate (equivalently, less inaccurate) than it. Furthermore, any probabilistic 
credence distribution is non-dominated by any non-probabilistic credence distribution: there are 
no non-probabilistic credence distributions such that they are at least as accurate as a probabilistic 
one in all possible worlds and also more accurate than a probabilistic distribution in at least one 
world. In short: non-probabilistic credence distributions are simply strictly worse off in terms of 
inaccuracy. Adopting a dominance principle of reasoning towards decision-making, Joyce argues 
that adopting a non-probabilistic distribution given the above is irrational. 
 
These two results suggest, insofar as we are only concerned with minimizing inaccuracy, that we 
should adopt a probabilistic credence distribution over a non-probabilistic one (insofar as the 
two are the only options) as a matter of epistemic rationality rather than pragmatic considerations 
like the Dutch Book. In other words, Joyce’s argument is a ‘nonpragmatic vindication of 
probabilism’ as advertised. 
 
III. Pettigrew’s Defense of the Principle of Indifference from Accuracy 
 
Pettigrew (2016) adopts much of the formal machinery of Joyce’s argument, and, indeed, can be 
seen to build off the conclusion that we should adopt probabilism. However, instead of adopting 
dominance reasoning, he argues that we should adopt a minimax principle of reasoning: we ought 
to adopt the credence distribution that minimizes the maximum inaccuracy possibly had. 
 
The minimax principle is motivated by what he calls ‘cognitive conservatism’, the idea that we 
should ‘avoid error’: minimizing the worst-case scenario – the maximum inaccuracy – appears to 
do just that. To be fair, Pettigrew does not really argue for it more than he simply asserts it; he 
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claims that there is no further grounds for arguing for cognitive conservatism over cognitive 
radicalism where one aims to maximize the maximum accuracy (and should thereby adopt 
a maximax principle instead of the minimax principle): “at this point, it seems to me, we 
have reached normative bedrock.” (2016, 46) So let us stick with the minimax principle for the 
sake of argument. 
 
Now, the gist of his argument is that he shows that the unique credence distribution that 
minimizes maximum inaccuracy is the credence distribution that is prescribed by the principle 
of indifference. 
 
Pettigrew (2016, 48) defines the uniform probabilistic distribution c0 – the very same one that 
the Principle of Indifference prescribes – given a set of finiteii propositions P and a set of possible 
worlds W generated from the logically consistent truth assignments to P: 
 
𝑐0 =  




In words, c0 assigns to proposition P a probability equivalent to the ratio of its being true to the 
totality of possibilia. The possibilia here, as Pettigrew is quick to emphasize, is dependent on the 
class of propositions we are concerned about; it is not mandated by the Principle of Indifference 
that all agents adhere to c0 with respect to some ‘one true’ partition of possibility space or set 
of propositions. 
 
In the simplest case, consider a single proposition: the coin flip will return heads. There are two 
possible worlds – two truth-values we can assign to this proposition – and only one in which it 









This is just what the Principle of Indifference prescribes. 
 
Pettigrew (2016, 51–52) aims to prove that this distribution uniquely minimizes maximum 
inaccuracy: assuming that the measure of inaccuracy I is egalitarian and renders indifference 
immodest, then for all credence distributions, if c ≠ c0, the maximum inaccuracy that c0 will incur 




𝐼𝑤 (𝑐0, 𝑜) <  max
𝑤 𝑖𝑛 𝑊
𝐼𝑤 (𝑐, 𝑜) 
 
In other words, c0 uniquely minimizes maximum inaccuracy. 
 
Iw is egalitarian if and only if it is only a function of the credence assignments and omniscience 
function’s assignments to any proposition, and not the content of the proposition itself. This 
seems fair enough as we are only concerned with the difference between the two distributions’ 
assignments over those propositions, not the content of those propositions per se. 
 
Iw renders indifference immodest iff there exists no c ≠ c0 such that c is at least as accurate as c0 
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in all possible worlds. The argument starts by assuming that there is a possible world where the 
chances in fact coincide with c0. Then, by construction, no other distribution is as accurate as 
c0 at that world. Hence, there is no c such that c is as accurate as c0 at all possible worlds. 
 
If the proof is right, then it seems that any c ≠ c0 is irrational by the lights of the minimax principle 
since there is another credence distribution one can adopt, c0, that goes further in minimizing 
maximum inaccuracy. Furthermore, no other distribution does that. 
 
I won’t get into the details of the proof (see Pettigrew 2016) for my argument later will focus 
on a more foundational aspect of the proof. However, here’s a simple example for conceptual 
clarity, again relying on the simplest case with a single proposition P = “the coin flip will return 




Again, there are two worlds: one in which ‘the coin flip will return heads’ is true (o(P) at w1 = 
1) and one in which ‘the coin flip will return heads’ is false (o(P) at w2 = 0). Consider the 
inaccuracy of c0 where c0(P) = 0.5 at each world when we use the Brier score: 
 
At w1: Cost = Iw1(c0, o) = (0.5 – 1)
2 = 0.25 
At w2: Cost = Iw2(c0, o) = (0.5 – 0)
2  = 0.25 
 
The maximum inaccuracy here is 0.25. Consider the inaccuracy of c at each world, where c(P 
= true) = 0.8. Then: 
 
At w1: Cost = Iw1(c, o) = (0.8 – 1)
2 = 0.04 
At w2: Cost = Iw2(c, o) = (0.8 – 0)
2  = 0.64 
 
The maximum inaccuracy here is 0.64 which is higher than the maximum inaccuracy had by 
c0, even though the maximum accuracy of c is in fact much higher than c0 at 0.04. The 
minimax principle will then tell us that c0 is rationally preferable to c in this case. 
 
In short, if the above is all right, then it seems we have a rational defense of the Principle 
6 
 
of Indifference from accuracy: the principle of indifference is the unique way to minimize 
the maximum inaccuracy of our credence distributions, given any partition of possibilities. 
 
IV. (Laplace’s) Devil in the Details: Equipossibility in Joyce and Pettigrew’s Accounts 
 
So far so good. However, as I have noted in the historical case of Laplace in the introduction, 
there is always a risk of putting things in by hand (‘equal possibility’) in order to get something 
out (‘equal probability’). Here I will argue that this is precisely what has happened with 
Pettigrew’s argument, but in a much subtler way: there is, again, an assumption of equipossibility 
in the background that is required for his account to take off. This assumption is hidden in the 
assumption of veritism. I show that the same thing occurs in Joyce’s argument as well, but that 
nothing in his argument turns on this issue since, unlike Pettigrew, Joyce did not take his 
argument to be defending the principle of indifference. 
 
Zooming out, Pettigrew’s argument essentially contains this assumption of equipossibility. When 
considering the maximum inaccuracy of c at each world, there is an additional seemingly trivial 
requirement that the measure of inaccuracy between a given credence distribution and the 
omniscient distribution at each world should be comparable to each other world’s measure of 
inaccuracy, such that we can find the maximum inaccuracy across worlds. 
 
As we have seen, the strategy for justifying this, for Pettigrew, is (at a very general level) this: 
Consider a measure such that the only things the measure cares about are the credence ascribed 
to a proposition, and the truth-values of propositions at a world. Possible worlds are 
distinguished by the truth-values they ascribe to propositions. Assume veritism (Pettigrew 2016, 
42): all we care about – the only cognitive value for epistemic decision-making – is truth and how 
close we are to truth (accuracy). Since there is no particular reason or another to choose one set 
of truth-value assignments over another from this perspective (they are just truths all the same to 
anyone with this perspective), there is no particular reason to favor one possible world or another. 
Each possible world, from the perspective of the measure, is ‘just as good’ as another. But this, 
in my view, is essentially assuming equipossibility: each possibility is equal to each other. 
 
Here’s one way to make this notion of ‘just-as-good’ concrete: we can understand Iw(c, o) to be 
a special case of the measure jwIw(c, o) which contain an indexical jw (for ‘just-as-good-ness of a 
world w’), except jw1 = jw2 = jw3 = … = jwn for n possible worlds; If this condition holds, then each 
possible world (and the level of inaccuracy at that world) is ‘just-as-good as’ each other possible 
world (the exact numerical values don’t matter since weights are relative to each other). In 
this case, the argument goes through for a rational justification of the Principle of Indifference 
from minimax reasoning. But is there a justification for this special choice of jw instead of one 
where jw1 ≠ jw2 ≠ jw3 ≠ … ≠ jwn? After all, there is only one way for each jw to be equivalent to each 
other, and many ways for them to differ. Note that in cases where jw differs across worlds, the 
minimax reasoning doesn’t hold. Returning to our toy case above with a single proposition and 
two possible worlds, suppose that jw1 = 5 and jw2 = 1. Then for c0: 
 
At w1: Cost = 5Iw1(c0, o) = 5(0.5 – 1)
2 = 1.25  
At w2: Cost = Iw2(c0, o) = (0.5 – 0)




And for c: 
 
At w1: Cost = 5Iw1(c, o) = 5(0.8 – 1)
2 = 0.2 
At w2: Cost = Iw2(c, o) = (0.8 – 0)
2  = 0.64 
 
Now, the maximum inaccuracy incurred by c0 is in fact higher than c. Minimax prescribes c, not 
c0, in this case. The hidden equal weights play a role, however subtle. Setting a uniform jw 
amounts to setting equal weights to each world, and this is required for Pettigrew’s minimax 
argument, but is there a good argument for this move? 
 
In statistical mechanics, there is a similar problem: why should the Lebesgue measure (a 
generalization of the uniform measure which applies in continuous settings) be used in 
measuring the volume of phase space? Why should each partition of the phase space be equal in 
volume to every other? In that case, however, there is a physical reason: it turns out that the (local) 
Lebesgue measure (or the Liouville measure) is invariant along any possible phase flow – any 
dynamical evolution of a system preserves the Lebesgue measure (a result due to the Liouville 
theorem); i.e. a volume of phase space, as it evolves along any physically allowed trajectory, 
maintains its volume. 
 
Is there any argument similar in force that justifies the choice of a uniform jw in the case of the 
principle of indifference? Any such argument better not prove too much. For example, one 
argument that Pettigrew might appeal to might be the thought that his argument for the Principle 
of Indifference applies only to ‘superbabies’ (Pettigrew 2016, 35) starting out in inquiry with no 
evidence whatsoever (except a choice of partition of possibility space, it seems). This superbaby 
would not know which possible world it is in since it has no evidence: each possible world is ‘just 
as possible’ to this superbaby. This seems to justify the equal weights between possible worlds. 
 
But the old problem of this approach being circular-or-unjustified comes back: why should this 
notion of ‘just as possible’ be relevant to probabilities at all? On one hand, if ‘just as possible’ 
just means ‘just as probable’, and the baby knows that each possible world is ‘just as possible’, 
then we can already apply the Principle of Indifference with no further argument, though our 
justification for using equipossibility becomes circular. On the other hand, if ‘just as possible’ 
is not related to probabilities or credences, then why should this notion be relevant in defending 
the equipossibility of possible worlds (in the sense of equal weights jw for each world) when 
weighing the inaccuracy of our credence distributions? Again, a defense of the possibility-probability 
bridge is required. 
 
What about the appeal to veritism, already briefly talked about? We can read it in two ways: to 
begin, we can read veritism in a stronger and more literal sense as saying that truth is all that 
matters. This is what at first appears to justify an equal weight. If truth is all that we care about, 
as this brand of veritism supposedly claims, then surely each possible world is just as good as the 
other from the perspective of truth, since each possible world just is a logically consistent 
assignment of truth-values to a set of propositions. However, consider that we can aim at truth 
in different ways. We can aim at truth by favoring the actual world; this however, would give the 
actual world an infinitely larger weight than other worlds: why care about the other worlds if we 
know what is actual? We can also favor the set of worlds which contain a certain number of true 
propositions or more (especially in finite cases as Pettigrew desires) and weigh other worlds with 
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fewer true propositions in decreasing order as the number of true propositions decrease. There 
are many ways to care about truth. Veritism in this stronger sense does not require an equal 
weight for each possible world. Equipossibility is a further assumption. 
 
Pettigrew’s veritism, furthermore, is a weaker one, which claims that accuracy in the sense laid 
out by Joyce and Pettigrew is the only thing that matters, as Pettigrew says so himself (2016, 42). 
What does accuracy mean here? It means to minimize accuracy across possible worlds. How are 
the possible worlds weighted in terms of accuracy? There is nothing said in this respect and 
nothing in this respect yet justifies equipossibility. The assumption that there is no reason to care 
about any world over any other – the assumption of equipossibility – must be put in by hand. 
 
Note that Joyce’s argument contains pretty much the same assumption: each world is compared 
with every other in terms of inaccuracy as well. However, Joyce does not defend the principle of 
indifference with that assumption, so we cannot fault him for the same problems discussed here. 
Furthermore, unlike the minimax principle (or minimax-regret as discussed briefly by Pettigrew 
(2016, 46)) adopted by Pettigrew which includes an inter-world numerical component that is 
affected when the worlds are weighted differently, the dominance principle does not have such 
an inter-world component: dominance is a binary notion while minimax is a matter of degree. 
For each possible world, a distribution is either dominated or it is not. We then simply consider 
whether a distribution is (strongly/weakly) dominated or not for each world; no numerical 
comparisons are required. However, a distribution incurs a maximum inaccuracy to some degree, 
and this is compared between worlds to find the maximum inaccuracy for a distribution between 
worlds, before we compare between distributions. Changing the weights of each world change the 
considerations and prescription of the principle as shown in the toy case above. In short, the 
choice of equal weights – the choice of equipossibility – matter for Pettigrew’s argument but not 
for Joyce’s argument, so it is no matter that Joyce does not defend the choice of weights. 
 
I have not yet argued for different weights between worlds, having only pointed out the possibility 
of doing so. Instead, all I am doing here is pointing out that Pettigrew’s argument for the 
principle of indifference crucially relies on this assumption of equipossibility, and I find no 
argument defending this position. Of course, what he could do is simply assume 
equipossibility as a fundamental rule – a ‘normative bedrock’ or something like that – and 
proceed on with his argument. However, in the absence of any positive argument for the choice 
of equal weights, the entire argument is unmoored. Alternatively, he could take ‘equally 
possible’ to mean ‘equally probable’ but using this notion of equipossibility to defend the principle 
of indifference is circular. 
 
Either way of defending the equipossibility assumption seems undesirable: I conclude that 
Pettigrew’s argument for the principle of indifference does not succeed simpliciter; it is at best 
unjustified and at worst circular. 
 
V. Redemption for Laplace? 
 
There is, however, one crucial saving grace for Pettigrew’s argument: it improves on and develops 
Laplace’s original argument to much more rigor than Laplace ever did. The original argument by 
Laplace essentially claims that equal possibilities entail equal probabilities; this seemed intuitive 
enough. However, there was never much of a clear notion of equal possibility, such that equal 
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probabilities could come out of the notion in a non-circular fashion. 
 
What Pettigrew has done here, together with my inclusion of the concept of weights for each 
possible world, is to show how, given an assumption of equal weights across possible worlds in the 
concrete way defined above, we can show fairly rigorously, using the machinery of accuracy-based 
arguments and the minimax decision-making principle, that we ought to adopt a uniform 
distribution, i.e. that we ought to adopt the Principle of Indifference and ascribe equal 
probabilities to each outcome. This explains Laplace’s original claim in a much more enlightening 
way and redeems Laplace’s claim: if we have equal possibility, then we have equal probability. 
 
Of course, the notion of equal possibility remains unjustified in both Laplace’s and Pettigrew’s 
case, even after being made suitably rigorous via the notion of weights. But perhaps this is the 




In a vivid example enacted by Tim Maudlin at a summer school I attended, Maudlin challenged 
someone –a defender of the principle of indifference – to a bet and told him only that there will 
be three possible outcomes A, B and C. The defender then bet according to the principle of 
indifference. Maudlin took out a coin and flipped it.iii Without looking at the outcome of the 
flip, Maudlin proudly proclaimed: “I win.” 
 
The moral I took from this incident was that not all possibilities are equal, and some justification 
must be made for the assumption of equipossibility. Pettigrew does not do this, and, as such, his 
argument for the Principle of Indifference does not succeed. 
 
Endnotes 
i Pettigrew uses ∑𝑝 |(c(p) – o(p)|2  which isn’t the Brier score strictly speaking; the modulus is unnecessary 
given that everything is raised to an even power. Numerically there are no differences. 
ii Pettigrew (2016, 58) notes that adopting c0 in infinitary cases leads to the usual problems for the principle 
of indifference like Bertrand’s paradox and potential conflicts with additivity.  
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